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Abstract 
We present the project aimed at creating a database of 
detailed architectural process models of memory-based 
decision models. Those models are implemented in the 
cognitive architecture ACT-R. In creating this database, we 
have identified commonalities and differences of various 
decision models in the literature. The model database can 
provide insights into the interrelation among decision models 
and can be used in future research to address debates on 
inferences from memory, which are hard to resolve without 
specifying the processing steps at the level of precision that a 
cognitive architecture provides. 
Keywords: inference from memory; process model; ACT-R; 
decision making; model database 
Introduction 
How do we infer which of two cars will be more durable? 
Which company will be more successful in the coming 
year? To address such questions, in a typical two-alternative 
forced-choice task of inference from memory (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996), two objects (e.g., two companies) are 
presented on a computer screen. A subject has to infer 
which of the two objects scores higher on a criterion of 
interest (e.g., the company growth in the next year) by 
relying on knowledge stored in memory.  
Models of inference describe how subjects make 
inferences by using attributes of objects (e.g., who is the 
company’s CEO) as cues. Many inferential models have 
focused on describing not just what the outcome of the 
inference would be, but also which processing steps a 
decision maker would take to reach a decision. These 
models include, among others, the various fast-and-frugal 
heuristics from the adaptive toolbox of heuristics 
(Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999), 
parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS; Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008) and sequential sampling models (e.g., Lee & 
Cummins, 2004).  
Such process models have increased substantially our 
understanding of how people make inferences (e.g., Bröder, 
2012) and why the inferential process is successful 
(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009), but perhaps more 
importantly they have raised other questions and fueled 
important debates: Do people rely on a repertoire of 
strategies or on a single strategy (e.g., Lee & Cummins, 
2004; Marewski, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Newell, 
2005; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008)? Which types of models 
(e.g., heuristics vs. more complex models) describe better 
people’s decision processes (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002; Newell & Bröder, 2008) and under what 
circumstances? When do people rely on non-compensatory 
as opposed to compensatory strategies (Glöckner & Bröder, 
2011)?   
One major barrier to addressing those and related 
questions is that many models are almost always 
underspecified compared to the data that they are tested 
against. Specifically, process models of decision making 
often remain silent about components of cognition that are 
the foundation of decision making, such as perception, 
motor action, or memory. We argue that specifying relevant 
cognitive-behavioral processes will help those models make 
more precise predictions about, for example, response time 
and other process data. The increased precision, in turn, will 
not only allow researchers to more easily tell potentially 
competing models apart, but also aid in addressing ongoing 
debates and open research questions.  
In fact, a significant amount of research has already 
started to embed existing decision models into detailed 
cognitive theories (Dimov, Marewski, & Schooler, 2013; 
Fechner, Pachur, Schooler, Mehlhorn, Battal, Volz, & Borst, 
2016; Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011; Marewski & Schooler, 
2011; Nellen, 2003; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & 
Harbison, 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). The aim of the 
current line of work is to expand upon these efforts by 
systematically implementing existing models of inference in 
the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007).  
In what follows, we will briefly introduce ACT-R and 
present a summary of the model database that we are in the 
process of constructing. We will then explain in detail what 
knowledge each of the decision strategies requires for its 
functioning. We will conclude by discussing the advantages 
and shortcomings of our models. Once finalized, we plan to 
make the database of architectural process models of 
decision making available to the public.  
ACT-R 
ACT-R is arguably the most advanced integrated theory 
of cognition. It has been used to construct models of very 
diverse tasks and phenomena, which include, among others, 
associative recognition (Schneider & Anderson, 2012), 
analogy making (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001) and 
multitasking (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008).   
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Table 1: Outline of the database of architectural process models of decision making, together with summaries of 
hypothesized procedural and declarative, symbolic and subsymbolic knowledge.   
 
Model Source 
Declarative 
knowledge  
Procedural knowledge  
Information at the subsymbolic  
level 
Recognition 
Heuristic 
Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer 
(2002) 
Alternatives 
Try to retrieve chunks representing alternatives. 
Select alternative corresponding to successfully 
retrieved chunk. 
Activation of chunks of alternatives 
(proportional to occurrence frequency in 
environment) 
Fluency Heuristic 
Schooler & 
Hertwig (2005) 
Alternatives 
Retrieve chunks representing alternatives and time 
retrieval using timing module. 
Select alternative with faster retrieval time. 
 
Exemplar Fluency 
Juslin & Persson 
(2002); 
Nosofksy (1984) 
Cue profiles 
Retrieve cue profile most similar to alternative’s cue 
profile and time retrieval using timing module. 
Select alternative with faster retrieval time. 
 
Exemplar Average 
Cue profiles 
Cue profiles with 
direct criterion 
knowledge 
Producing an average criterion value through 
blending over cue profiles similar to alternatives’. 
Select alternative with larger blended criterion value. 
 
Exemplar 
Individual 
Cue profiles 
Cue profiles with 
direct criterion 
knowledge 
Retrieve cue profile with direct criterion knowledge 
most similar to alternative’s cue profile . 
Select alternative with higher population of most 
similar cue profile. 
 
Set of rules 
Prototype 
Johanson & 
Kruschke (2005) 
Cue profiles 
 
Separate productions firing for each cue-profile-pair 
difference. 
Variable utility of evaluative productions 
Prototype Fluency  
Cue profiles 
High criterion 
value prototype 
Retrieve an alternative’s cue profile.  
Retrieve high-criterion-value prototype and time 
retrieval using timing module. 
Select alternative, for which high-criterion-value 
prototype was retrieved more quickly. 
 
Instance-based 
learning theory 
average 
Gonzalez, Lerch, 
& Lebiere 
(2003);  
Logan (1988) 
Cue profiles 
Cue profile pairs 
 
Retrieve cue profiles of both alternatives.  
Produce an average response by blending over 
choices with similar cue profile pairs. 
 
Instance-based 
learning theory 
individual 
Cue profiles 
Cue profile pairs 
 
Retrieve cue profiles of both alternatives.  
Retrieve cue profile pair most similar to cue profile 
pair of current alternatives. 
 
Parallel constraint 
satisfaction 
Glöckner & 
Betsch (2008) 
Cue profiles 
Cue profile pairs 
Cue profile pair 
prototypes 
Retrieve cue profiles of both alternatives.  
Retrieve cue profile pair prototype most similar to 
cue profile pair of current alternatives. 
 
Take-the-best 
reinforcement 
Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein (1996) 
Cues 
Cue values 
Determine which cue to consider by firing 
production with highest utility. 
Decide as soon as cue values differ. 
Different production utility for each cue 
Take-the-best 
declarative 
Cues 
Cue values  
Cue validity pair  
Retrieve next most valid cue. 
Decide as soon as cue values differ. 
 
Tallying 
Cues 
Cue values  
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Stop retrieval upon retrieval failure. 
Count positive cue values. 
 
Unit-weight linear 
model 
Cues 
Cue values 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Stop retrieval upon retrieval failure. 
Count positive and subtract negative cue values. 
 
Weighted additive 
Cues  
Cue values 
Cue validities 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Stop retrieval upon retrieval failure. 
Compute weighted sum of positive cue values. 
 
Weighted linear 
model 
Cues 
Cue values 
Cue validities 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Stop retrieval upon retrieval failure. 
Weighted sum of positive and negative cue values. 
 
Take-the-first-cue 
Marewski & 
Schooler (2011) 
Cues  
Cue values 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Decide as soon as cue values differ. 
Activation of chunks of cues proportional 
to occurrence frequency in environment 
Minimalist 
Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein (1999) 
Cues  
Cue values 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Decide as soon as cue values differ. 
Activation of chunks of cues equal 
Take-the-last 
Cues  
Cue values 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Decide as soon as cue values differ. 
 
Sequential 
sampling model 
Lee & Cummins 
(2004) 
Cue values 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Count positive cue values. 
Stop retrieval upon reaching threshold. 
 
Weighted 
sequential 
sampling model  
Cue values  
Cue validities 
Retrieve cue with highest activation. 
Weighted sum of positive cue values. 
Stop retrieval upon reaching threshold. 
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ACT-R describes cognition as a set of modules that 
communicate through a procedural module realized as a 
central production system. The production system consists 
of production rules (i.e., if–then rules) whose conditions (the 
“if”-parts) are matched against the modules. If a rule’s 
conditions are met, then the rule can fire and the specified 
action can be carried out. Modules model different cognitive 
processes, such as vision (visual module), motor action 
(motor module), declarative memory (declarative module), 
short-term information storage (imaginal module) and time 
tracking (timing module; Taatgen, van Rijn, & Anderson, 
2007). Productions send commands to modules to perform 
an action or change their state, or to access content placed in 
modules’ buffers. In fact, because productions can only 
access content placed in the buffers, these can be thought of 
as processing bottlenecks. For instance, a production rule 
cannot access all information stored in the declarative 
module, but only the information placed in its associated 
retrieval buffer.  
Productions are the representation of choice for 
procedural knowledge, while declarative knowledge, such 
as factual and episodic knowledge, is represented as chunks. 
Perceptual and memory modules, respectively, perceive and 
retrieve information in the form of chunks. A chunk consists 
of a set of slots, where each slot is (a pointer to) another 
chunk. For example, a chunk containing information about a 
company’s annual revenue will have a slot with the 
company’s name and another slot with its revenue.  
ACT-R distinguishes a symbolic and a subsymbolic 
system. Productions, modules and buffers constitute the 
symbolic system, whose dynamics are governed by a set of 
equations, describing ACT-R’s subsymbolic system. At the 
subsymbolic level, chunks’ activations determine, for 
example, retrieval time or recall probability; productions’ 
utilities reflect which productions were more successful in 
the past and therefore more likely to fire; visual parameters 
determine the time needed to shift visual attention to an 
object in the visual field, while motor parameters determine 
the time to generate a motor response.   
Each ACT-R model is essentially composed of 
specifications of how declarative and procedural knowledge 
interact, both at the symbolic and subsymbolic levels. We 
will now focus on describing the declarative and procedural 
knowledge used in defining the models in the database. We 
refer those interested in a detailed exposition of ACT-R to 
Anderson (2007). 
Model building blocks 
The models of inference that we will consider are presented 
in Table 1. In implementing these models in ACT-R, we 
relied on the building blocks that this cognitive architecture 
provides.  
Perceptual and motor processes 
All models have equivalent perceptual and motor 
processes, involving visual perception from a screen and 
manual action on a keyboard. The models first perceive 
each of the alternatives presented on a computer screen and, 
after executing a sequence of cognitive steps, they make a 
response by pressing the appropriate key on a keyboard. The 
primary contribution to behavioral predictions of the 
perceptual and motor processes in our models is to add a 
realistic estimate of perceptual-motor latency. 
Declarative chunks 
The factual knowledge (e.g., “Berlin is a capital”) that a 
model relies upon to make a decision is stored in declarative 
memory. Ten types of chunks are needed to construct the 
models in the database. Table 2 provides a summary of 
those chunk types and examples in Lisp code for each. Note 
that the examples are given for the city-size task, in which 
cities act as alternatives and subjects need to infer which of 
two cities is larger. 
The simplest chunk type contains just the name of the 
alternatives. For example, if the alternatives are cities, 
whose relative sizes need to be inferred, such a chunk 
contains the city name (e.g., “Berlin”). These chunks are all 
that is required for inferential models, which rely on 
accessibility information, such as the recognition and 
fluency heuristics. 
The second chunk type contains an entire cue profile of an 
alternative (i.e., the set of cues associated with an 
alternative). Such chunks are used, among others, by 
exemplar and prototype models. Some exemplar models 
also require chunks with direct criterion knowledge in 
addition to the cue profile. Moreover, prototype models 
require not only cue profiles, but also a stored prototype of 
an object with a high criterion value.  
 
Table 2: Declarative knowledge categories.  
 
Chunk type label Chunk examples in Lisp code 
Alternative (berlin name Berlin) 
Cue profile (berlin name Berlin airport yes capital 
yes ...) 
Cue profile with 
direct criterion 
knowledge 
(berlin name Berlin population 
4000000 airport yes ...) 
High criterion value 
prototype 
(big-city name prototype airport yes 
capital yes ...) 
Cue profile pair (pair1 airport1 yes airport2 no 
capital1 yes capital2 no …) 
Cue profile pair 
prototype 
 (prototype-left airport1 yes airport2 
no capital1 yes capital2 no …) 
Cue (cue1 type airport) 
Cue value (berlin-airport city Berlin cue airport 
value yes) 
Cue validity  (airport-validity cue airport validity 
90) 
Cue validity pair   (cue-pair first airport second capital) 
Note. In these examples, chunk names, used for convenience, are 
presented in bold; slot names, indicating a specific attribute, are in 
italics, while slot values, representing the attribute values, are in 
normal font.  
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 Resembling exemplar and prototype models, instance-
based learning theory and parallel constraint satisfaction 
consider cue configurations to make inferences. However, 
they differ from the former in that they require chunks, 
which contain pairs of cue profiles. For example, the model 
“Instance-based learning theory individual” retrieves the cue 
profiles of both alternatives and then retrieves a cue profile 
pair from a successful previous trial. It then makes an 
inference based on the decision outcome of the retrieved cue 
profile pair. Similarly, our implementation of the parallel 
constraint satisfaction model requires a prototype of a 
successful cue profile pair. 
 Unlike configural models, like exemplar models, cue-
abstraction models (Newell & Bröder, 2008) operate on 
individual cues. Such models, like take-the-last, retrieve 
cues one by one. Take-the-last requires separate chunk types 
for a cue and for the values of the alternatives on that cue. In 
addition to these chunks, other models, like take-the-best, 
require information about cue validities (i.e., the probability 
of making a correct inference using only this cue if the cue 
discriminates; see, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 
1991), which, if taught in the experiment (e.g., Bröder, & 
Schiffer, 2003), are stored numerical values. Finally, in 
some experiments one is provided only with the validity 
hierarchy, which can be represented as validity pairs of 
subsequent cues.  
Procedural knowledge: The sequence of processing steps 
The procedural knowledge of a model consists of a fine-
grained sequence of processing steps (i.e., productions) that 
the model relies upon to make a decision. In all models, the 
sequence of processing steps includes commands to the 
visual module to encode the information presented on the 
screen and to the motor module to press a key to respond in 
a computerized experiment. As for the rest, the exact 
sequence of processing steps follows the original model 
definitions. 
For example, fast-and-frugal heuristics usually rely on 
separate cues, on which detailed search, stopping and 
decision rules operate. Those models often theorize about 
the order, in which cues are considered. This ordering can 
be modeled through productions. In addition, productions 
can also determine if the model weighs cues equally, as in 
tallying, or differently, as in the weighted additive model, 
and execute this process. If cues are weighted equally, 
productions are required to send a request to declarative 
memory to retrieve the cue values. Productions then 
increment by 1 the number, which tracks the count of cues 
with a positive cue value of the alternative of interest. Other 
models, such as exemplar models, rely on all available cue 
information stored in a single chunk to make a decision. In 
such models, procedural knowledge is more peripheral to 
the decision process and mostly focuses on retrieval 
attempts.  
Productions not only initiate retrieval, but are also 
dependent on what is retrieved, because a key determinant 
of which productions can fire is the available declarative 
knowledge. Specifically, at each point in time only those 
productions, whose condition match the buffer states, will 
be considered to fire. Ultimately, which chunks are retrieved 
from memory will determine what could be placed in the 
buffers and therefore which productions will match.  
Information at the subsymbolic level 
At the subsymbolic level, there is continuously valued 
information, which is necessary for the execution of some 
inferential strategies. However, productions cannot directly 
read out subsymbolic values. Instead, the model needs to let 
subsymbolic values guide symbolic knowledge. Thus far, 
we have identified four ways in which subsymbolic values 
play a key role in the execution of strategies. 
First, the activation of chunks representing alternatives 
contains information about the alternatives’ occurrence 
frequency in the environment. Specifically, base-level 
activation is a function of prior history of a chunk, which 
partially depends on environmental occurrence frequency, 
which, in turn, is related to many criteria of interest 
(Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008). 
Accessibility-based strategies, such as the fluency heuristic, 
track the retrieval speed of alternatives as determined by 
their activation and choose the alternative, which was 
retrieved noticeably faster. 
Second, activation can order cues, because cues which 
have a higher occurrence in the environment likely will have 
a higher activation. Thus, these cues may be more likely to 
be considered first in lexicographic strategies, such as  
take-the-first-cue or a sequential sampling model. 
A third way in which information at the subsymbolic 
level can be used is as an implicit cue weighting 
mechanism. This weighting can take place through 
spreading activation, which is determined by the degree of 
association between the chunks placed in buffers and the 
chunks in declarative memory. If the cue profile of one of 
the alternatives is currently placed in the imaginal buffer, 
then it will activate cue profiles in memory through 
spreading activation. Those cue profiles will then have 
precedence in retrieval. Exemplar models rely on this 
process to make an inference about the alternative’s 
criterion value. 
Finally, production utility contains information about 
prior success. Production utility determines which 
production is more likely to fire when two or more 
productions are competing. If such a competition takes place 
between productions, which select which cue will be 
considered next, the utility of these productions can act as a 
cue’s importance (e.g., as its validity, see Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008, for the hypothesis that such a 
reinforcement learning process can teach cue validities) in 
lexicographic cue-abstraction models. This is the 
mechanism used in the model “Take-the-best 
reinforcement”, which encodes the selection of each cue 
with a separate production and then learns the success of 
those cues through trial and error. 
1934
Discussion and conclusion 
We aim to provide a database of ACT-R implementations of 
decision models used in the literature on inferences from 
memory. We have divided these models into their key 
components. The models can serve as a basis for model tests 
and further model developments. Specifically, this database 
can be used, first, in model comparison simulations on the 
outcome and process level, whereby one identifies regions 
in the parameter space where these models diverge. Second, 
this database can be used in future studies to identify 
decision processes using both behavioral and neural data. 
This is an important advantage of ACT-R, because any 
ACT-R model can generate fMRI predictions on top of 
behavioral process predictions, such as response time, 
because of the established module-to-brain mappings (for an 
introduction, see Borst & Anderson, 2015). 
In addition, we think that the systematic examination of 
the building blocks of existing decision models will help us 
gain insights into how the models are related to each other. 
For example, through these implementations, we see that the 
parallel constraint satisfaction model can be conceived as 
functionally similar to an instance-based learning model, 
which stores and retrieves prototypical cue profile pairs. 
It is important to note that in creating our ACT-R models 
we were forced to work with the mechanisms that ACT-R 
provides. For example, the original parallel constraint 
satisfaction model is cast as a connectionist network, in 
which connection weights are iteratively updated after each 
decision. This leads to cues effectively changing their 
validities as trials progress. As currently conceived, our 
model does not reproduce this behavior. Nevertheless, the 
model “Instance-based learning theory average”, which in 
our database is very similar, effectively provides such a 
mechanism and can be thought as functionally analogous to 
the original parallel constraint satisfaction. 
Such redefinitions and novel distinctions introduced in 
our modeling endeavor were due to the partial overlap 
between the various decision models in the literature. 
Another such distinction that we decided to introduce was in 
the declarative representation, which cue-abstraction 
models, like take-the-best and the sequential sampling 
model introduced by Lee and Cummins (2004), rely on. 
Originally, both models were conceived as, first, 
considering a cue, and only then examining the values of 
that cue for both alternatives. We have kept this definition 
for take-the-best and other heuristics. However, we have 
decided to label those models, which retrieve cue values 
directly, in a manner purely determined by declarative 
principles, sequential sampling models. These models can, 
for example, consider the value of cue 2 for alternative A, 
followed by the value of cue 4 for alternative B, and so on. 
Another remark concerns the high degree of detail, which 
ACT-R introduces when decision models are implemented 
in it. The fine-grained way in which ACT-R models are 
specified has forced us, in many cases, to make assumptions 
about processes, about which the original models remained 
silent. For example, we had to rely on assumptions about 
how cues are ordered in take-the-best. We have considered 
two ways to order cues in this work. Our first 
implementation relies on declarative retrieval to order cues, 
while the second one relies on procedural knowledge and 
utility learning. These assumptions reflect, so we hope, 
realistic ways of learning. On the one hand, in many 
experiments on take-the-best, one is explicitly taught the cue 
hierarchy, which is then stored as declarative knowledge. 
On the other hand, in natural settings, ordering cues 
according to validity is likely to occur through 
reinforcement learning, whereby one has had significant 
experience with considering several cues in the same 
setting.  
To conclude, we would like to stress that Table 1 does, 
naturally, not include all possible tweaks and modifications 
that one can introduce when constructing models in ACT-R. 
It will be left to input from the different researchers working 
on inference from memory to determine which of our 
current ideas will survive, and which ones will be replaced 
or extended by others.   
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